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Abstract
This paper examines the irreversible process of the ruble zone disintegration. Theoretical
fundamentals of a common currency area, with modifications incorporating a mechanism of
transition from central planning, are discussed. The key reason for the ruble zone break-up is
the discontinuation of indirect transfers that were provided mainly by Russia via underpricing
energy exports to other republics. Being cut-off from such transfers and unable to finance
rising trade deficits with Russia, the independent stales wish to disconnect their economies
from the ruble /.one. Among other economic arguments for leaving the ruble zone presented
by the former Soviet republics are: a desire to insulate their economies from the ruble zone
inflation, and a willingness to collect seigniorage revenues from printing their own
currencies. The paper critically evaluates these and several other arguments. The abrupt
break-up of the ruble zone causes interruptions in supplies of essential materials and
consumer goods, and an income downfall among the republics. The foundation for a new
inter-state payments mechanism is proposed in order to cushion these negative effects. A
system of independently traded currencies with flexible exchange rates is viewed as a
reasonable, yet distant solution.

I.

INTRODUCTION*

The process of disintegration of the former Soviet Union is assuming a logical sequence. It
started from the break-up of political ties, followed by the dissolution of central planning and
the central government budget at the end of 1991. This, in turn, caused serious interruptions
in traditional trade linkages between the former republics of the USSR as trade balances were
financed either through direct budgetary transfers or indirect transfers (under- and overpricing
of trade). In 1992, virtually all the republics moved closer to world market prices in the interstate exchange of goods. Most dramatically, Russia substantially increased prices of its energy
exports to other republics and diminished its role as a donor of indirect transfers. This, in turn
caused a substantially increased demand for money in those republics which were
traditionally importers of underpriced energy and which in the short run face an inelastic
demand for Russian energy. If the demand for external savings cannot be met by export
earnings or by issuing debts honored by Russia, this prompts the republics to leave the ruble
zone and to establish their own currency. Consequently, the ruble zone, formed and supported
by the principles of central planning, is also disintegrating.
This paper examines this unprecedented process of the ruble zone disintegration. It describes
a theoretical framework for the common currency area as advanced by Mundell [1961] and
McKinnon [1963] with adjustments suitable for a mechanism of transition from central
planning. Such modification primarily departs from a high short-term inflexibility of
economic linkages between the participating states.
The paper starts from a presentation of theoretical requirements of a common currency area in
Section II, followed by their adjustment to the characteristics of transition from central
planning in Section III. This analysis is supported by the empirical evidence from the former
Soviet states in Section IV. In particular, the current state of affairs (in mid-1993) with
respect to the ruble zone disintegration is presented and the main arguments advocated by the
republics leaving the ruble zone are exposed. Based upon the theoretical foundation (Sections
II and III) and the empirical evidence (Section IV), a variety of proposals to solve the postSoviet currency crisis is examined in Section V. A conclusion in terms of future
developments of the post-Soviet payment system is contained in Section VI. Different ways
of departing from the ruble zone and related to them different types of national currencies are
examined in the Appendix, with a more detailed description of the cases of Estonia and
Kirgizstan, the two former republics which have broken away from the ruble system.

This paper reports on research undertaken in a project on prerequisites of integraling the former
Soviet Union slates into the world economy. Financial support from the Alfried Krupp von Bohlen
and Halbach Stiftung is gratefully acknowledged.

II.

PREREQUISITES FOR A COMMON CURRENCY AREA

In order to fully understand the reasons for the breakdown of the ruble zone among the
former Soviet Union republics, it is necessary to spell out the economic requirements that
ensure creating and sustaining a common currency system within the framework of politically
independent states. Under central planning, trade and capital flows are administratively
determined by a single central economic authority. Thus, there are inherent administrative
conditions for the introduction of a common currency. The former Soviet Union currency, the
ruble, satisfied the single currency functions of a medium of exchange, a unit of account and
a store of value. The ruble performed all of these functions passively, since the amounts of
ruble issued for trade and capital transactions and the amounts of ruble savings by enterprises
were administratively decided rather than being determined by market forces.
As advanced in the economic literature, a common currency is a higher stage of an optimum
currency area. A common currency area was first defined by Mundell [1961, p. 657] as "a
domain within which exchange rates are fixed". This simple definition has never been really
questioned as too simplistic. On the contrary, it found strong reinforcements, among others,
from McKinnon |1963, p. 717]. who claimed that "a fixed exchange rate system with
guaranteed convertibility of currencies is almost the same thing as a single currency regime",
and from Kindleberger [1968, p. 517] describing it as "a system of permanently fixed rates as
an equivalent to the existence of a single world money". Undeniably, a currency unification
requires as a critical element permanently

fixed

exchange

rates. Therefore,

further

requirements of a currency union are consistent with the requirements for fixed exchange
rales. Among them a crucial role is played by the harmonization of monetary policies of
member slates. Such harmonization becomes particularly difficult when inflation differentials
among member stales are significant. Inflation differentials increase the economic cost of
maintaining the currency union and they require accelerated capital transfers from low
inflation countries to high inflation countries to offset absorption of the inflation tax by low
inflation members of the union. In other words, conditions of large and uneven inflation
among the members provide incentives to member states to increase the amount of
seigniorage (or inflation lax collected from low inflation member states) by accelerating the
money supply growth beyond the rate applied by others. Therefore, it becomes critical for the
currency union to establish a single monetary constituency - a single central bank, or a
centrally supervised system of central banks (such as the US Federal Reserve System) that
would be in charge of regulating money supply in order to avert inflation lax spillovers
among member stales. If inflation shocks are non-sterilized by monetary policies of member
states, a break-up of the fixed exchange rate system leading to a break-up of a currency union

is argued to become the better solution.1 Furthermore, repeated inflation shocks within the
currency union may lead to a loss of the "store-of-value" function of the unified currency and,
correspondingly, to a risk premium paid by asset holders for prefering the single currency
over other currencies.
A single monetary constituency would correspond to the situation of a single currency in the
unified system, or a "hegemonial currency" understood as a dominant currency to which other
currencies are anchored (permanently fixed) [see Vaubel, 1978, p. 22].
Another possible alternative of a currency union (or an optimum currency area) is a
"community variant" as advanced by McKinnon 11977, pp. 47-54J. In this case, there are
separate currencies with fixed exchange rates guaranteed by a full cooperation of the
members central banks with respect to:
-

monetary policy targets,

-

joint agreements which allow discretionary policy reactions to correct deviations from
predetermined targets, -

-

rules on foreign exchange interventions and interstate capital transfers.

Again in this case, a full coordination of monetary policies is strictly required for the
currency union. Whenever there are substantial differences in credit policies, for instance,
stemming from dissimilarities in structural adjustment programs between the member states,
the monetary policy coordination becomes extremely difficult and the currency union may be
unsustainable. Undoubtedly, within the currency union each member cannot pursue its own
stabilization and growth policies attuned to its specific needs [Salvatore, 1990, p. 608]. In
particular, the areas or states with excessively high unemployment, partially related to their
slow structural adjustment, may wish to pursue more expansionary monetary and fiscal
policies. On the other side, the booming regions may opt for contractionary policies to curb
inflation. Based on these differences it can be argued that a currency union is much easier to
maintain when structural similarities among the regions are relatively strong.
Another vital condition for a currency union is a high degree of mobility of goods and
production factors among member states. Impediments to trade lead to distorted money
balances between the members, either to an excess supply of money in a surplus-generating
state, or to an excess demand for currency in the deficit state. Consequently, without

1

This particular view was advocated by Hayek 11976] who claimed that anti-inflationary effects
could be generated by a "free currency competition", i.e. a break-up of the fixed exchange rate
system.

compensating capital flows, fixed exchange rates may occur unsustainable and the currency
union will break-up. On the side of the labor market, restrictions to the mobility of labor
generate unbalanced unemployment rates. Such disproportions normally promote uneven
monetary and fiscal policies correcting unemployment rates. Again, a lack of policy
harmonization may prompt the currency union break-up.
If the currency union is sustained and supported by capital transfers, equilibrated payments
balances and fixed exchange rates may be attained. Then, the strongest beneficiaries from the
union are backward states running expansionary monetary policies. Staying in the union gives
them a guaranteed position of net transfer recipients. On the other side, net transfer donors
may find it too burdensome to continue subsidizing backward states and therefore, may opt to
depart from the union. The only incentive for the continuation of their net transfers provided
to others arises when the poorer states supply essential resources and materials which the net
donor is unable to find elsewhere and for which his demand is highly inelastic. This would
motivate the transfer donor to maintain the currency union and to continue providing transfers
to the slates with whom it is closely integrated.
On the side of costs of a currency union to member states, a demonstration effect on real
wages may occur [as interpreted by Williamson, 1975]. This effect becomes active if there is
a strong tendency towards real wage equalization among the union members especially
presented by the peripheral states where productivity is much lower. Such tendency is
inherent among the conditions for the currency union. Excessively increased real wages in
low productivity areas trigger rising wage costs and generate high unemployment rates,
which, if not compensated by capital transfers from more affluent, slates, may release social
pressures to leave the currency union.
A demonstration effect on real wages and inflation tax spillovers are the most evident
economic costs of a currency union. One may also identify some political costs, such as a loss
of sovereignty, or a sacrifice of the autonomy of central banks and government budget
authorities that may ultimately promote a departure from the currency union. The economic
and political costs of the currency union shall be carefully weighted by the states against the
possible economic benefits which may include:
-

greater opportunities for economies of scale in production,

-

elimination of the exchange rate risk,

-

lower costs of money transfers,

-

reduced information costs about exchange rate variability and foreign
regulations.

exchange

There is no uniform system of assessing the costs of membership in the currency union versus
the benefits stemming from it. Different nations tend to assign different importance to
different factors. Given the enormous economic, ethnic, political, and historical variety
including differences in economic size and resource endowment the former Soviet Union
republics cannot be expected to have a uniform pattern of evaluating their affiliation with the
common currency zone.

III.

DRIVING FORCES OF MONETARY DISINTEGRATION: LESSONS FROM
THEORY

The initial assumption of the presented model is a system of inter-slate trade administratively
regulated by central planning. Relative' prices are administratively .set and, therefore,
inflexible. They have no impact on trade volumes and- their sectoral and regional
composition. The system of economic linkages is bound by ihe common currency, which
serves the Junctions of a unit of account and, passively, a medium of exchange and a store of
value. Since relative prices are fixed and do not matter in the decision-making process they
substantially deviate from relative prices in international markets.
The administrative determination of prices and traded volumes results, at least in the short- or
medium-run, in highly price-inelastic supply and demand conditions for traded goods.
Specifically, producers of final goods in one state are traditionally administratively linked to
suppliers of materials in another state. They are neither accustomed to searching for
alternative sources of supplies nor encouraged to produce such substitutes themselves. Central
administrative decisions are generally not aimed at increasing competition.
What is particularly important, such a distorted trade system provides indirect income
transfers. Donors of such transfers are stales exporting "underpriced" goods in comparison to
world market prices, or accepting imports of "overpriced" products. Particularly under central
planning, practices of "underpricing" oil, natural gas and selected other resources, and
"overpricing" manufactured products are widespread.
When the central planning mechanism is discontinued and decisions about trade volumes and
directions are decentralized, trade partners cannot immediately find alternative supply and
demand sources. There will be quite obviously a natural resistance of energy exporters to
continue subsidizing others by prolonged sales of underpriced energy and thus to forego
export earnings offered by world markets. In extreme cases, by exploiting inelastic demand or
a monopoly position, they will adjust prices closer to the revenue maximizing range, or
somewhat below it if any sources of competitive energy suppliers emerge. Their price
increases will undoubtedly result in a large accumulation of money balances in their accounts.
Consequently, it can be argued that energy-exporting stales will experience an excess supply

of currency, while energy importers will endure an excess demand for currency. The deeper
the changes in relative prices, the bigger the distortions in money balances that will occur.
Correspondingly, the energy exporting states will enhance their trade surpluses and the
energy importers will amplify their trade deficits.
In a common currency area, a situation of excess supply of money in surplus countries means
an absorption of inflation that this state may want to transfer to others by exporting the
inflation tax, i.e. providing vast central bank credits to its deficit-experiencing partners
[Buiter and Eaton, 1983].
Serious problems in deficit countries arise in a situation of excess demand for money. These
countries may equilibrate their money balances either by accelerating exports to regions
outside the common currency area, by obtaining credits from the surplus country, or by
breaking-up from the common currency area through creating their own money. In the latter
case, a creation of an independent currency may be accompanied by a flexible exchange rate
which adjusts to current account disequilibria. The flexible rate will, therefore, assume the
role of a stabilizer and prevent a wide-spread transmission of inflation impulses.
The option of extensive central bank credit to deficit states will transfer the inflation tax to
them. If, however, such pro-inflationary credits are restrained, they will sooner or later opt to
issue their own currency, either parallel to the common currency, or separately by a
declaration of legal tender rights granted only to the new currency.
An exceptionally long period of price inelasticity in inter-republican trade is one argument for
the break-up of the currency union. There are other arguments.' The critical argument in
reference to the continuation of the currency union arises when stabilization policies that
include price liberalization as their inherent ingredient are not coordinated. Under such
circumstances, repeated price liberalizations occurring in different regions at different limes,
will undoubtedly send many uncoordinated inflationary shocks. This would require repealed,
sometimes unexpected, sterilizations by credit tightening from the central bank in charge of
money emission. Such destabilizing disturbances and discretionary monetary policy reactions
by no means can guarantee the monetary authority credibility which is required for stabilizing
expectations of private economic agents and to lower their lime preference rate. To shield
themselves from

repeated

inflation

shocks

brought

about

by

uncoordinated

price

liberalizations, regional central banks may consider leaving the currency union.
Furthermore, ongoing inflation shocks may induce undesirable fiscal disturbances through
repeated Oliveira-Tanzi effects, i.e. a temporarily diminished tax collection in real terms and
deeper budget deficits, following the acceleration of inflation, due to deferred or evaded tax
payments by economic agenls |see, for instance, Dornbusch, 19921.- For economies willing to
introduce programs of macro-stabilization and structural adjustment, the unpredictable fiscal

situation and the lack of success with deficit reduction are unacceptable. Again, to shield
themselves from repeated inflation shocks that would contribute to a pervasive occurrence of
the Oliveira-Tanzi effect, countries may choose to leave the currency union.
In relation to the fiscal situation one can derive the next argument which seems to have a
particularly strong relevance to the post-Soviet transformation process. It is a battle for
seigniorage (inflation tax) defined as government revenue from printing money. In the
framework of a currency union only the central bank responsible for money creation collects
seigniorage. The union could be sustained if there were a system of apportioning seigniorage
revenues among the stales. Cassella |1992J emphasizes that seigniorage gains can be
adequately distributed between the stales only if their monetary policies are fully coordinated.
But if such direct non-interest credit transfers are not secured regional central banks may opt
to leave the union, create their own currency and collect seigniorage from its emission. If
there are several central banks entitled to issue the common currency, the battle for a higher
real value of seigniorage can only be won by those whose money supply grows
unproportionately stronger than others.
On the other side, slaying in the union may induce some monetary benefits as well. For
instance, Cassella [1992J views the currency union as an institution imposing a beneficial
monetary discipline on all participants. For a small country, participation in the union is
beneficial up to a point when it can still receive a favorable share of seigniorage, and a large
country stays in the union as long as it can gain more from the discipline brought by a
common currency. Whatever the merit of the monetary discipline argument is, without direct
capital transfers from a dominant country's central bank, smaller country central banks will
find incentives to break away from the currency union since the other alternative, that is an
uncontrollable money creation, is too inflationary and shall be viewed as an inferior solution.
The currency union problem arises again in the context of privatization. Considering different
levels of economic development among nations in the currency union and a situation of
unpredictable inflation, it is extremely difficult to appraise the value of firms prepared for
privatization. A single currency, strongly battered by unpredictable inflation shocks, is an
impediment to asset valuation of these firms. Especially smaller, and more developed and
productive economies within the union would very likely attempt to introduce their own,
more stable currency that would sustain the nominal value of capital of firms throughout the
lengthy process of their privatization [Hansson, 1993, p. 168]. Likewise, foreign direct
investment is normally attracted by a low inflation environment. Under the circumstances of
relatively stable domestic prices both transaction risk (related to cash conversion), and
translation risk (related to balance sheets comparability) are diminished. For the purpose of
lowering the overall risk for direct investment from abroad, a particular region or state may

consider introducing a new currency separated from the highly inflationary common
currency.
In addition to these economic reasons for departure from the common currency, there is
always an argument of political sovereignty. National central banks may want to gain their
full autonomy by divorcing themselves from the dominant central bank's monetary policy, or
from monetary policies stemming from a multilateral agreement. It may be especially
important for economies in transition that national monetary policies are customized to the
specific structural adjustment needs of particular regions. The ambition of gaining political
sovereignty sometimes prevails against the economic rationale for staying in the currency
union, especially for backward economies which are net recipients of indirect and direct
transfers from more developed regions. Governments of depressed regions are ready to
sacrifice economic gains for the sake of a broadly defined political autonomy by seceding
from the union. Cases supporting this argument include: Slovakia breaking up from the union
with the Czech Republic, or Bangladesh from Pakistan, besides the cases of former Soviet
republics examined below. It may be, however, argued that the tradeoff between direct
economic gains and political sovereignty in a case of depressed economies may be illusive if
the political autonomy is treated as a public good. In such a case, the national independence
may guarantee a necessary social environment that may lower the risk for foreign direct
investment and ultimately generate additional income.
In summary, one may conclude that individual states are expected to be motivated to leave
the union if
-

they are donors of direct or indirect transfers, and, therefore, importers of inflation,

-

they are not bound by highly inelastic imports from other stales in the currency union,

-

they wish to shield themselves from

repeated hyperinflation

and

uncontrollable

depreciation of the common currency against other currencies,
-

there is no single coordinated monetary policy,
decentralization (and, especially, price liberalization) programs are uncoordinated among
the union states,

-

they wish to gain seigniorage revenues from printing their own money,
they wish to base their privatization programs on the net present value assessment and to
invite foreign direct investment by creating a stable currency and a low currency risk
environment,

-

they want to gain full political sovereignty and monetary autonomy.

To address the question how important these arguments are for individual former Soviet
states, the empirical evidence from these nations' transition experienced primarily in 1991 and
1992 shall be presented.

IV.

THE PROCESS OF MONETARY DISINTEGRATION WITHIN THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION

Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991 almost all of the former Soviet
republics have established plans to introduce independent currencies, thus making the ruble
/one disintegration more apparent. Table 1 presents in a condensed form the degree of
departure of individual states from the ruble zone by either the introduction of fully
independent currency, or the introduction of a parallel currency with or without plans of
transition to an independent currency, or, ultimately by a continuous affiliation with the ruble
zone.
Table 1 - Degrees of Participation in the Ruble Zone by the Former Soviet Union Slates (as of June 1,
1993)
State

Official Currency Parallel Currency

Ultimate (Planned) Date of Introduction
Currency
of the Independent
Currency

CIS-Members
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bclorussia
Kazakhstan

Ruble
Ruble
Ruble
Ruble

Kirgizstan
Moldova
Russia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan

Som
Ruble
Ruble
Ruble
Ruble
Ruble
Ruble

Manat
"Bel. Rubcl"
Limited own
coins
Coupons
- •
Karbovanets
-

-

-

Lei
Manat
Hrivna
-

May 17, 1993
unspecified
July 1993 (planned)
unspecified
-

Lari
Lat
Lit

June 22, 1992
unspecified
July 1993 (planned)
July 1993 (planned)

Non-Members
Estonia
Georgia
Latvia
Lithuania

Kroon
Ruble
Ruble
Ruble

Coupons
Rublis
Talon/Wagnori
(coupons)

Source: Author's own compilation.
Table 1 presents only the stale of introduction of cash, or legal tender money. Disregarded are
rubles created by open reserves which either the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) granted to
other republics' central banks or which the other central banks issued to domestic commercial
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banks and business firms (in the following called "credit rubles"). The republics' central banks
generated such crediLs independently until May 1993 when their ruble credit issuing rights
were suspended. The separation of cash rubles and credit rubles is unique for the Soviet twotier monetary system inherited from the past legislation of the consolidated Soviet Union. The
rights of republican central banks to issue their own credit rubles meant, in fact, a departure
from the ruble zone as long as their emission was not authorized by the CBR. Presently this
procedure is legally restricted due to the fact that the CBR has an exclusive responsibility to
regulate the broad supply of rubles according to the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) legislation.
As Table 1 shows, there have been two full departures from the ruble zone until June 1, 1993:
Estonia and Kirgizstan with three more (Latvia, Lithuania, and Turkmenistan) scheduled for
July 1993. At the same time, a number of republics have introduced transitionary currencies,
or ruble coupons that in essence denote gradual departures from the common currency (for
details, see Appendix). The empirical reasons that prompted the states to fully, or to partially
leave the ruble zone are very different and complex. They deserve a careful examination in
the context of the driving forces presented above.
A very powerful role in the decision to disassociate themselves from the ruble zone has been
played by the break-up of the system of indirect transfers in trade exercised in the former
unified country. In the previous system, these transfers were mainly manifested by exports of
underpriced oil and natural gas (by Russia, Turkmenistan, and, to a small extent, Azerbaijan)
and by accepting overpriced imports of light industry and food industry goods (mostly by
Russia)|Orlowski, 1993, pp. 4-7]. The remaining republics were.net recipients of indirect
transfers via either imports of underpriced energy, or exports of overpriced industrial
products.
The terms "overpriced" and "underpriced" are related to deviations of the former Soviet
Union domestic prices from world market prices recalculated by the official exchange rates
(also sizeably distorted from the equilibrium market rate). With the ongoing process of
economic and political independence of the republics in 1991 and in 1992, the indirect
transfers have been substantially reduced. In 1990, such net transfer receipts constituted a
significant share of the republics' GDP, being the largest for Moldova (24 percent), Lithuania
(17 percent), and Georgia (16 percent)|Orlowski, 1993, p. 7J. In 1992, Russia made a series
of decisions to adjust its prices of exported fuels closer to world market levels [see Noren and
Watson, 1992]. Consequently, its partners faced sharply deepening trade deficits with Russia
generally not compensated for by exports outside the ruble zone. These newly arising deficits
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with Russia emerged for all remaining states of the former Soviet territory.2 The deficit states
and their firms had four options available to them in terms of compensating capital inflows.
They could:
1. increase exports outside the union and convert external currencies into rubles in already
functioning currency exchanges,
2. obtain credits from the CBR,
3. generate their own "republican" ruble credits,
4. receive external savings from OECD countries.
With the unprecedented depreciation of the ruble from 128 rb per US dollar at the end of May
1992 to 1,024 on May 31, 1993, vast external currency earnings were conveniently located in
outside banks as a store of value. Russia's President Yeltsin's decree of October 1992
committing domestic companies to convert their hard currency foreign deposits into rubles
had a very limited impact on such conversion in practice. Under such circumstances, the
excess demand for rubles exhibited by deficit republics could be covered mainly by credits
generated either by the CBR, or by republican central banks. The second source of the credit
expansion contributed to the invasion of "republican" rubles parallel to the CBR ruble. Thus,
it gave rise to the internal fracturing of the ruble zone.
The dimension of the credit expansion can be assessed from soaring CBR net liabilities to
other central banks in the ruble zone as measured by the increased nominal value of other
central banks' reserves with the CBR in the period between March and November 1992
(Table 2). The data reflect the 196-fold increase in the total nominal credit officially
generated by the ruble zone central banks in the examined period. This credit hike was
instrumental to high inflation in the ruble zone republics. Furthermore, it shall be noted that
the official data in Table 2 do not precisely reflect the magnitude' of credit issued by central
banks of individual republics. From the scattered information on this subject, the Central
Bank of Ukraine issued arbitrarily, without consultations with the CBR, 500 billion credit
rubles in June 1992 alone [The Economist, September 19, 1992J, and it repeated massive
unauthorized ruble credit emissions at least four times in 1992 for the purpose of "unloading"
payment bottlenecks, i.e. covering a shortage of rubles, to facilitate imports of Russian oil,
gas and other resources [Report on Selected Problems of the World Economy, Institute of
Finance, Warsaw, March 1993]. The one-time credit injection in June by the Central Bank of
Ukraine accounted for about 25 percent of the total ruble supply in the republic. In the second

Sec also Tarr [1993] for a preliminary assessment.
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half of 1992, Russia's commercial banks repeatedly rejected accepting Ukrainian-generated
credit rubles (and also MoJdovian) because of their sharply declining market value in terms of
other republican rubles |Kommersant, October 19, 1992, pp. 29-31].
Table 2 - Central Bank of Russia (CBR) Net Liabilities to Other Central Banks of the Ruble
Zone in 1992

End of

Bin Rubles

Percentage
from the
Month

Change Ratio of the Change in
Liabilities
to
Previous CBR
Russia's Monthly Nominal
GDP

-

0.8

March

6,140

April

61,889

- 907.9

10.0

May

110,695

78.9

9.6

June

178,753

61.5

9.2

July

312,391

74.8

15.7

August

309,099

-0.1

-0.3

609,589

97.2

21.7

October

September

1,177,977

93.2

25.8

November

1,212,203

2.9

1.7

19642.7
or 196 times

12.7

Total:
March-November

-

Data Source: CBR, Balances of Corresponding Accounts; and Dabrbwski [1993].
The uncontrollable credit creation by republican central banks sent a very strong blast to the
ruble /.one causing a substantial delineation of purchasing power between the "republican"
rubles. The first mutual exchange market of credit rubles issued by republican central banks
that allowed monitoring their exchange rates was installed in Latvia on July 20, 1992. Table 3
presents the exchange rates between "republican" rubles and Latvian rubles as reported by the
Central Bank of Latvia based on quotations on the free market exchange of these pseudocurrencies in Latvia. It shall be noted that all the individual rates were set on the one-to-one
level upon the Latvian market inception. Within roughly ten months the rates significantly
departed from the initial parity, with the Ukrainian rubles depreciating by far the most. On
the other extreme, the "appreciation" of the rubles issued by Georgia and Azerbaijan in terms
of the Latvian ruble can be presumably explained by the relatively more restrictive credit
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supply by their central banks, although precise data have not been disclosed to the public.3
These disproportions added to the ruble zone disintegration and promoted the formation of
independent currencies.
As an attempt to control inflation, mainly before July 1992, and after the beginning of May
1993, the CBR tried to limit its lending to the republican central banks and to control their
credit emission as well. But the attempts of CBR to tighten credits gave rise to unauthorized
emissions of republican ruble credits, meaning creations of parallel money eroding the ruble
zone from inside. The control measures adopted by the CBR included: quotas set on cash
deliveries to other republics, and setting up "credit monitoring offices" at other central banks.
By all means, these measures failed to effectively restrain the credit expansion.

Table 3 - "Republican" Rubles Values per Latvian Rubles
(All rates were 1.0 on July 20, 1992)
Republics
Belarus

May 7, 1993
1.9245

Lithuania

1.4483

Kazakhstan

1.6839

Azerbaijan

0.8985

Kirgizstan

1.3378

Russia

2.9000

Uzbekistan

1.6694

Georgia

0.8086

Armenia

1.1711

Turkmenistan

2.1005

Moldova

1.4224

Tajikistan
Ukraine

1.4905
22.7272*

*May 14, 1993 quote.
Source: Central Bank of Latvia (reported by Rzeczypospolita, May 9, 1993).

3

Table 3 does not allow for any estimate of cross rates between the CIS ruble rates and the Russian
ruble rate because the quotations are derived from strictly bilateral supply and demand conditions.
"Markets" for individual CIS rubles in Latvia are fully separated from each otJher.
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The size of CBR direct credit to other central banks in the ruble zone is reflected by the
corresponding "technical credit" accounts in Table 4. The first column presents the 1992 limit
assigned by the CBR for a direct credit to other central banks. The second column reflects the
magnitude of the overdraft or the available balance on this account. The latter should be
understood as central banks actual credit drawing from the CBR aimed at providing further
loans to facilitate imports from Russia, or used for other purposes. The size of quotas granted
to individual republics appears to be rather arbitrary. For the second largest state of the CIS,
Ukraine, the credit limit was set at only 15 billion rubles while for Kazakhstan it was set at 70
billion. The allowed overdraft on the Ukrainian Central Bank account reached 84 billion
rubles by September 15, 1993. This policy reflects the lack of consequence and the lack of an
appropriate mechanism of defending the ruble zone by the CBR.

Table 4 - CBR "Technical" Credit to Other Central Banks in the Ruble Zone (bin. rubles)
Republic

1992 Quota

Available Balance (+) or
Overdraft (-) on
. September 15, 1992

5

+0.6

Armenia

12

+4.7

Belorussia

40

+6.1

Kazakhstan

70

-5.6

Kirgizstan

8

+2.3

Moldova

5

+1.2

Tajikistan

Azerbaijan

6

+3.9

Turkmenistan

20

+ 13.6

Uzbekistan

10

5.3

Ukraine

15

-84.3

Georgia

20

+10.3

Estonia

0.5

+1.3

-

-0.8

0.5

+0.3

Lithuania
Latvia

Source: Kommersant, October 19, 1992; and Niezavisimaja Gazela, November 25, 1992.
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In addition to Russia, Turkmenistan, the other net donor of indirect transfers in the previous
system, also provided sizeable credits to its main export recipients due to large price increases
of export natural gas. More specifically, it granted a credit of 125 billion rubles to Uzbekistan
in the second half of 1993 [Business Central Europe, No. 2, June 199.3, p. 551. It seems that
similar payment bottlenecks which plagued the European part of the CIS in 1992, started to
penetrate the Central Asian stales in 1993. Again, interruptions in credit deliveries from the
states experiencing trade surpluses and the formal halt on credit emission by non-Russian
central banks in May 1993 may prompt the states to leave the ruble zone.
In a close relation to uncontrollable credit give-aways in 1992 and in the first four months of
1993, the ruble zone experienced very high inflation rates. It is a willingness to insulate
themselves from the transmission of inflation brought by the ruble that prompts the nations to
seek independent currencies [see, for instance, Kommcrsant.-October 19, 1992, p. 30]. With
new, more stable currencies their, governments hope to introduce more credible stabilization
programs and seek external assistance for their implementation. These programs shall be
customized to the specific needs for domestic economic transformation of individual
republics. Thus, their monetary policies shall not be excessively geared to sterilization of
repeated inflation impulses transmitted via the ruble zone. Furthermore, there are no chances
to introduce a common structural adjustment program for the CIS due to a substantial
incomparability of size, production patterns and financial conditions of individual republics
[see Michalopoulos and Tarr, 1992].
The argument of protection against inflation seems to be the most crucial economic reason for
the formation of independent currencies. Former Soviet states certainly blame the ruble zone,
and indirectly, the monetary authorities of Russia as a key player in the post-Soviet monetary
system, for the transmission of inflation [The Economist, May 22, 1993, pp. 78-79].
Moreover, the view that the introduction of separate currencies by all states of the former
Soviet Union will play a strong anti-inflationary role and should be considered as the
essential prerequisite for their independent reform programs is strongly advocated by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF officially wants most of the CIS republics to
leave the ruble zone by the end of 1993, and it has promised monetary assistance to support
the introduction of their new currencies [Business Central Europe, No. 2, June 1993, p. 49].
It is extremely difficult to evaluate the postulate of insulating the republics from excessive
inflation in the ruble zone due to the limited reliability of the officially reported data.4 In

4

For instance, in the March 10, 1993 issue of the PlanEcon Report [Russian Fxonomic Monitor, p.
3] Russia's 1992 retail price-based inflation was reported to be 1750 percent, while the official
report of the Russian Government released at the end of March gave an inflation rate of 2600
percent.
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addition, the official statistics are not adjusted for a high degree of still existing repressed
inflation by price controls. Most notably, Uzbekistan, whose 1992 inflation of 840 percent
was the lowest reported among the CIS states (by the PlanEcon Report) still keeps 80 percent
of retail prices administratively fixed, while Russia virtually abandoned central retail price
fixing with the final liberalization of oil and gasoline prices in the beginning of June 1993.
Notwithstanding these obstacles, it can be argued that the states that have experienced the
highest inflation rates are the most eager to leave the ruble zone [Kommersant, October 19,
1992, p. 30J.
To substantiate this claim. Table 5 shows inflation differentials between individual CIS states
and Russia in 1992. There is a clear evidence that the states whose inflation rates outgrew
Russia's rate have already broken away from the ruble zone (Ukraine and Kirgizstan) or have
formally announced intentions to do so (Azerbaijan and Belorussia). Their central banks
injected large amounts of credit to facilitate essential imports from Russia, during a period
when nominal ruble prices were booming (since the beginning of 1992). Those states lagging
behind Russia's inflation suppressed price increases by maintaining large margins of
administratively fixed prices, thus delaying an abrupt dissipation of the monetary overhang
(most notably Uzbekistan), or by having extensive domestic substitutes for energy imports
from Russia (mainly Turkmenistan). It has become evident that all of the republics that have
not yet expressed intentions to leave the ruble zone had a negative inflation differential with
Russia (lower than Russian inflation rates) in 1992.
Table 5 also presents the computation of differentials between the percentage decline of the
real net material product produced (NMPP) in individual republics and in Russia.5 The
Russian NMPP was estimated to have fallen by 20 percent in 1992 comparing to 1991. There
is hardly any connection between the NMPP drop and the republics' eagerness to leave the
ruble zone. Therefore, one may argue that real income shocks do not seem to have played an
important role for the monetary affiliation with the ruble zone. The largest reductions in the
real NMPP could be observed in the cases of Armenia, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan, all of
which have been inflicted with dramatic domestic conflicts. Moreover, their social and
political unrest does not favor any change of currency, because the introduction of a new
currency is costly. On top of this, their continuous affiliation with the ruble zone may
motivate Russia to sustain the military and food assistance for them, as it has been proven in
the cases of Tajikistan and Armenia.

5

The net material product produced is the tola] value of all material products (excluding services)
produced by industrial sectors, as opposed to the net material product used, which is the total
value of these products distributed for consumption and investment.
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The availability of political and economic assistance from Russia is directly related to the
willingness of individual republics to establish political sovereignty. The argument of
political sovereignty is increasingly advanced by the states willing to leave the ruble zone
[Hansson, 1993]. The republics seeking political independence from Russia, such as Estonia
and Kirgizstan, have already effectively left the ruble zone, while those who strongly depend
on Russia's political and military aid at the time of their domestic conflicts are bound to slay
in it. On the economic side, republican central banks are also interested in a separation from
the CBR monetary policy. Their full autonomy is an essential precept for an independent
monetary policy geared to their specific structural adjustment needs. 6

Table 5 -

Differences in Real NMPP Growth Rates and Inflation Rates between the CIS
States and Russia in 1992, in Percentage Points

Republics

Inflationa

-

Change in Real NMPP

Azerbaijan

+530

-8

Ukraine

+430

+4

Belorussia

+300

+9

Kirgizstan

+10

-6

Kazakhstan

-12

+6

Moldova

-290

-1

Tajikistan

-300

-11

Armenia

-420

Turkmenistan

-770

Uzbekistan

-910

-23
+5
+7

Changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Data Source: PlanEcon Report No. 5-6, 1993, pp. 2 and 3.

Political sovereignty may have played a major role in decisions to leave the ruble zone by the
former Soviet republics who opted also not to join the CIS, namely: Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Georgia. Despite the fact that they received substantial direct transfers

On the other side, formal departures from the ruble zone create political conflicts as well. Most
dramatically, the Kirgizstan decision to introduce the som on May 14, 1993 prompted the postcommunist government of Uzbekistan to close its land border, cut-off telephone lines, stop bank
transfers, and even to ban purchases of the neighbor republic residents on its local market |The
Economist, May 22, 1993, p. 17]. These measures were imposed to insulate its economy from the
massive inflow of rubles. In May 1993 there were 55 billion rubles in circulation in Kirgizstan, of
which only 6 billion had been exchanged for som [The Economist, May 29, 1993, p. 621.
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|()rlowski, I992| and indirect transfers |()rlowski, 19931 from Russia in the framework of the
unified Soviet Union they were willing to sacrifice these capital inflows for the sake of
political sovereignly. Their governments have announced plans to install national currencies
as a manifestation of power and as a declaration of a full-scale autonomy.
Another practical argument contributing to the dissipation of the ruble zone is related to
differences in timing and sequencing of economic deregulation among the former Soviet
republics. Among the largest republics, Russia started its deregulation program first with the
January 1992 price liberalization of almost 90 percent of all retail prices. Ukraine did not
move in this direction until October 1992. Kazakhstan has approached price liberalization
more gradually. Different moments of price liberalization released inflation shocks in the
ruble zone at different limes. For Russia, the biggest jump in the retail price-based inflation
was reported in February 1992 (of 245 percent on the monthly basis), and a similar reaction
in Ukraine did not happen until the end of 1992. Such misalignments in inflation within the
common currency area have already sent (and are likely to send further) repeated inflation
shocks. Consequently, there has been a substantial asymmetry between the countries in terms
of optimal taxation rales, i.e. the rales that would maximize government revenues. Under
such circumstances, individual stales would rather prefer to have independent currencies to
optimize benefits from the inflation tax because their participation in the ruble zone
diminishes fiscal gains from inflation. Moreover, since inflation shocks are expected to occur
repeatedly, the Olivcira-Tanzi effect is also expected to have a pervasive character. This
argument is supported by the initial outburst of inflation in Russia in 1992 which caused a
significant slump in tax collection within the next several months due to the overwhelming
number of firms and individuals seeking tax deferrals, or possibly, evading tax payments. As
Table 6 shows, the inflation shock in the first quarter of 1992 and the corresponding fiscal
surplus were followed by a deepening budget deficit in the second and the third quarter of
1992, while the last quarter budget turned into a surplus.7

7

The last quarter of 1992 improvement in the fiscal balance of Russia should be, however,
interpreted with a high degree of caution. In the beginning of October 1992 the CBR designated a
special 500 bin ruble credit to special accounts at commercial banks called "card indexes number
2" aimed at facilitating an average for enterprise net liabilities in areas. The majority of this credit
was used by enterprises to pay deferred taxes. Thus, one may argue that it was the CBR which in
fact paid taxes. Without this "credit" the budget deficit would still amount roughly to 250 bin
rubles.

19
Table 6 - Russia's Average Monthly Inflation and Cumulative Budget Deficit (-), or Surplus
(+)in 1992
1992 (quarters)

Average Monthly
CPI Inflation

Budget Balance in
Current Rubles

Ratio of Budget
Balance to GDP

I

141.5

+21.5

+1.7

III

21.3

-216

-5.4
-6.6

I-III

12.7

-544

I-IV

30.0

+225 est.

-

Source: CBR - Monthly Balances, and Dabrowski [1993].
A strong impetus to introduce a national currency comes in practice also from the willingness
of individual governments to collect seigniorage (inflation tax). Following the May 1993
agreement between the CIS central banks, the CBR has exclusive rights to issue central bank
credit. Thus, seigniorage revenue from this credit is effectively collected by Russia. The
magnitude of such credits understood as a part of the total seigniorage was substantial in
1992. As Table 2 shows, the total net liabilities to the CBR accumulated by all central banks
in the ruble zone in the period March - November 1992 amounted to 12.7 percent of Russia's
GDP. 8
Such high share of seigniorage revenues in GDP by far exceeds shares of total increases in the
central bank monetary base as a share of GDP in high inflation economies. For instance, in
the period 1975-1985 the highest shares of seigniorage in GDP could be observed for Italy
(6.6 percent), Turkey (5.1 percent), Peru (4.9 percent), or Brazil (4.1 percent). Even Bolivia
during its hyperinflation scored "only" 5.0 percent [Sachs and Larrain, 1993, p. 341]. The
seigniorage in the ruble zone in 1992 resulted from the willingness of the individual central
banks to generate more credits in order to transfer inflation impulses to the others. With the
changes in May 1993, which were strongly influenced by the IMF and lied to its crediting
conditions for the former Soviet states, seigniorage revenues from the CBR crediting of other
central banks are more restricted and inflation tax spillovers among the republics are blocked
by the formal ban on non-Russian central banks to issue credits. This will prompt the central
banks to move into their own currencies that would allow them to generate seigniorage
revenues and to partially equilibrate their fiscal deficits.
The final empirical argument for the ruble zone disintegration is directly derived from
unstable, high inflation disturbances of the ruble and the resulting fast-track depreciation of

Such credit is only a pail of seigniorage of central banks in the ruble /.one. Kven more credit
(around 54 percent in the case of the CBR total credit) was generated directly to state enterprises
IFinancial Times, April 3/4, 1S)93|.
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the ruble vis-a-vis OECD currencies. The argument states that the unstable and falling ruble
impedes asset valuation of firms prepared for privatization. It becomes almost impossible to
conduct the revenue forecasts, the present value analysis, and the return on investment
calculation in the presence of the rapidly declining ruble value parity to the US dollar and to
other Western currencies. At the end of May 1992, the market ruble-per-dollar exchange rate
was 12S. but on June 2, 1993 this exchange rate reached 1,024, meaning an approximately 9fold nominal depreciation of the ruble over the period of one year. Consequently, the
assessment of profitability of foreign investment and joint ventures is made virtually
impossible by the unpredictable ruble depreciation. Thus, asset valuation of companies
assigned for privatization and ventures with foreign capital participation can only be based on
a rationale not supported by any viable efficiency calculus.
Despite the rationale for the ruble zone disintegration, one may find some economic
advantages of maintaining the ruble as a common currency for"" Russia as the dominant
economic force within the system. Preserving the ruble zone may be viewed as economically
beneficial to Russia for at least two reasons. Firstly, it seems to help to sustain Russia's export
markets in the former Soviet republics since, at least in the short run, there are limited options
to find equivalent markets outside the ruble zone for a large number of its industrial products.
Secondly, Russia shall be interested in a continuation of some indirect transfers to the
neighbouring republics in order to diminish their negative income shocks that would trigger
an immigration influx of mostly ethnic Russians into its territory. A sudded wave of
immigration would enhance Russia's unemployment and housing shortage problems.
In conclusion of the survey of the driving forces behind the ruble zone disintegration, one
may state that there are almost no reasons to fix or to maintain the ruble as a common
currency system. Only to the extent that trade between the republics is highly inelastic, the
common currency is helpful in facilitating trade relations, yet solely in the short run. On the
contrary, the sovereignty and autonomy ambitions, the maximization of seigniorage, and the
introduction of new currencies to support structural adjustment and privatization programs,
all favor the ruble zone disintegration. The importance of these arguments for individual
republics cannot be easily established because of their different structural adjustment needs
and different degrees of implementing stabilization and deregulation programs. Those
republics which may find alternative recipients of their exports and alternative sources of
imports (especially the European states of the former Soviet Union) may favor a faster
currency separation. In addition, the republics that have advanced their deregulation programs
also may want to seek a corresponding autonomy of their currencies (the Baltics and
Kirgizstan). In practice, the ruble zone disintegration can be viewed as a case of "creative
destruction" during the turbulent period of the initial demolition of traditional interrepublican economic links set up in the past by the mechanism of central planning. Once the
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new cooperation patterns based on market conditions are established, a new institutional
foundation for the interstate payments mechanism can be constructed.

V.

REFORMING THE CURRENCY UNION: AN ASSESSMENT OF DIFFERENT
PROPOSALS5

The dramatic decline of inter-republican trade in 1992 and its expected further reduction in
19939 have caused deep negative income shocks. This situation prompts many both Eastern
and Western economists to come forth with the proposals to improve the inter-republican
payment system while, at the same time, assuming that the ruble zone will have to be
eventually dismantled. On one extreme, several proposals have been launched based on the
assumption of a fixed exchange rale system between the new currencies. On the other
extreme, an inter-republican payments system based on flexible exchange rates between the
currencies and on their full convertibility was advanced.
The most radical form of the fixed exchange rate approach is a currency board supported,
among others, by Hanke and Schuler [1991], Milton Friedman [1991] and Alan Walters
[1992]. A currency board is a formal institution that issues a new currency backed on a oneto-one basis by commodity money or by a foreign hard currency. Such a board cannot engage
in discretionary monetary policy but stands ready to convert its currency issues into the
reserve money. A general agreement on such a board for the CIS seems to imply that in the
beginning a new currency is introduced pegged to the US Dollar, or to a basket of convertible
currencies, parallelly to national currencies which may be more or less gradually replaced.
This means in practice an introduction of a third, by far more solid currency simultaneously
applied to all the member states.
The solution has several flaws. Apart from political inconveniencies, the monetary
mechanism of a typical board does not guarantee financing of existing trade imbalances
between the republics, because a board issues a new domestic currency only in return for the
foreign currency and therefore, has no credit-creation power. This practically means, a
currency board will be unlikely to facilitate Ukraine's payment crunch for the delivery of
Russia's oil. In addition, the CIS is a very large economic block by far exceeding experiences
of existing currency quasi-boards of small open economies such as Singapore or Hong Kong.
This means that the board would have to be endowed with a fairly large stock of foreign
currency [Fieleke, 1992, p. 22] despite of the galloping depreciation of the ruble. It appears
unlikely that foreign governments arc prepared to subscribe to the required dollar equivalent.

9

For instance, the Ukrainian Government in its official report before the June 18, 1993 summit
between Presidents Yeltsin of Russia and Kravchuk. of Ukraine anticipated a 50 percent decline of
Russia's oil exports to Ukraine in 1993 comparing to 1992.
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Any partial solution, meaning a quasi-repudiation of the outstanding currency with a foreign
exchange backing and convertibility provided only for a newly issued currency, may not be
feasible, because it will diminish the confidence in the board's new currency as well.
Another serious concern about applicability of a currency board for the CIS is derived from a
diminishing mobility of labor caused by the erected national borders. If, at the same time,
labor cannot accept reductions in wage rales the currency board will necessarily cause uneven
unemployment rates corresponding to productivity differences between the regions. In this
case, different monetary policies are desirable to restore full employment in the regions but
such policies cannot be implemented with a currency board [see also Fieleke, 1992, p. 16].
Finally, in general terms, different monetary policies with an active role of credit are much
needed today among the CIS states at the time of their economic transformation and deep
structural adjustments. A currency board normally neither allows differentiated monetary
policies tuned to the specific resource endowment of the regions. Nor is it permitted to issue
credit aimed at financing trade imbalances. At least in a short-run it will not solve basic credit
needs of the CIS economies. In practice, different proposals of a currency board for the CIS
have been advanced in order to reduce uncontrollable money-creating and inflationgenerating powers of republican central banks. But it seems more realistic to put pressures on
central banks to control the credit expansion by conditioning further external assistance upon
it.
An alternative solution to a currency board which is also based on the fixed exchange rate
system is a multilateral payments union as advanced by Bofingcr and Gros [1992J. This
arrangement is based on the general foundation of the European Monetary System and is
claimed by the authors to be applicable to the CIS. According to the proposal, independent
CIS currencies are linked by a fixed exchange rate system and could be pegged to Western
currencies, preferably to the European Currency Unit, via the Russian Ruble. Simultaneously,
the payments union could be expected to act as a multilateral clearing house and as a provider
of credit facilitating temporary bottlenecks in inter-statc payments [Bofinger and Gros, 1992,
pp. 10-17]. However, given the present state of affairs, the solution looks increasingly
implausible for at least two reasons. Firstly, such an arrangement requires a full reserve
backing (as a currency board docs as well) since it is bound together by fixed exchange rates.
Bofinger and Gros estimate the required external injection of such reserves at 3-4 billion
dollars. Observing the size of payment arrears that emerged in the CIS in 1992 and in 1993,
this hard currency endowment may, however, be inadequate. Alternatively, Russia, as the
dominant state of the system, will have to designate such reserves to the union, but given its
present political pressures and income decline, it probably has neither incentives nor
resources to do so. Secondly, the multilateral payments union requires establishing fully
coordinated, if not uniform, monetary and fiscal policies. Most of all, it would require Russia
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to control inflation and to establish credible credit and cash supply policies. So far, these
conditions have not been met. Furthermore, uniformity of monetary and fiscal policies
implies directly exogenously determined, non-autonomous transformation programs that may
not be consistent with the heterogeneity of resource endowment in individual states.
On the assumption that it will not be possible to introduce fiscal and monetary discipline
which is required for the ruble convertibility, several economists have advanced another
currency arrangement for the CIS generally described as a parallel currency [Kazmin and
Tsimailo, 1991; and Soros, 1991]. The proposed parallel currency would be a new, fully
convertible currency backed by foreign reserves that would circulate together with the
indefinitely inconvertible ruble. Supply of the new convertible currency shall be regulated by
an independent international institution [according to Soros, 1991), and if the exchange rate
between the new currency and the ruble is fixed such a currency would be simply issued
within the framework of a currency board. Thus, with fixed rates, the parallel currency
solution does not differ from the currency board. The excess demand for the new currency
would persist as long as severe current account deficits between the republics were
experienced. But with flexible rates between the ruble and the new currency, balance of
payments disequilibria would be more easily corrected. There are differences in the proposed
ways of introducing a parallel currency. Kazmin and Tsimailo [1991] suggest to issue the new
currency by granting credits to enterprises, but only to those which produce consumer goods,
in order to promote their output. Alternatively, Soros [1991] postulates to give away to each
resident an amount of 10 to 15 US Dollars every month without any equivalent. Today, this
translates to more than an average monthly salary in rubles. To enterprises, Soros proposes to
grant a lump-sum in "Soviet ECU's". Whatever the merits of these proposals are, the new
parallel currencies seem unlikely to solve liquidity problems related to serious current account
imbalances between the republics.
The introduction of yet another currency seems likely to promote speculation, and would
result in high costs of currency conversion unnecessary to be borne within the same economic
system. In addition, selective give-aways of the new currency only to consumer goods
producers would probably result in a discrimination of other, perhaps more effective
producers. Again, a parallel currency solution would require uniform fiscal and monetary
policies because of the need for common rules of its introduction. Such unified policies may
not be suitable for structural adjustment programs customized to the resource endowment of
individual republics.
The developments that contributed to the disintegration of the ruble zone described in Section
IV seem to suggest that the most plausible solution to the problem of repairing the ailing
payments and currency system among the post-Soviet stales consists of a new inter-state
payment mechanism (1SPM). Such mechanism should be based on new, independent national
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currencies, which arc fully convertible at flexible exchange rates. Valuable suggestions for
the construction of such a mechanism are presented by Fischer [1992, pp. 44-45]. The case
for an inter-slate payment mechanism is based upon the advantage of convertibility over a
payments union. Main reservations against a payments union are related to its prolonged
central steering of trade and payments. Lessons substantiating these reservations can be drawn
from the European Payments Union (EPU) in the 1950s, where the EPU played an active role
in directly managing trade and payments for an extended period of time. A centralized
institution similar to the EPU would be against the general trend toward economic
decentralization that is taking place in the post-Soviet economic system. It would not
guarantee elimination of market distortions in inter-republican economic relationships. On the
other side, convertibility between independent currencies with flexible exchange rates is
consistent with the general character of economic reforms. However, at least in the short-run,
a problem of financing suddenly erupting severe trade deficits arises. To facilitate the
settlement of payments imbalances, a new inter-state payments mechanism (ISPM) is
proposed by Fischer [1992]. Desirably, it should be a temporary measure in order not to
perpetuate concessional elements in the republican economic relations. Providing a short-term
credit for the republics that would unload payment bottlenecks is a primary function of such a
mechanism. The rationale behind it is based on three precepts. Firstly, the ISPM would allow
to economize on central banks reserves. Secondly, it would take away credit facilitating
responsibilities from the CBR, which, by itself has been inclined to give a priority to crediting
Russian economic institutions first and thereby discriminating against other republics [Raport
o Wybranych Problemach Gospodarki Swiatowej, Institute of Finance - Warsaw, 1993].
Thirdly, it would probably manage short-term credit better than the rudimentary CIS banking
system with too many small, technically unprepared, and undercapitalized banks. 10
A necessary condition for the ISPM is that the republican central banks will have to agree on
mutual credit limits to prevent credit constraints and imperfections stemming from bilateral
agreements on trade [Fischer, 1992, p. 44] and from inter-state trade protocols containing
trade quotas on numerous commodities. A possible source of reserves for the ISPM shortterm financing may be provided by external assistance, however, with a matching
participation of republican central banks so that the republican authorities will assume a
partial responsibility for prudent credit management. The central banks cooperation seems to
be necessary to ensure a temporary nature of the ISPM. If external assistance was the only
source of the ISPM reserves, the central banks and other local economic institutions would
very likely treat the scheme as a permanent source of concessionary funding. Such a

10

Sec "Banking and Investment Survey" [Business Central Europe, Nr. 2, June 1993]. For
illustration to the problem it takes approximately 6 months to clear s single check between two
banks of the CIS.
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treatment would create a moral hazard problem and would delay the process of necessary
structural adjustments.
It is imperative that the ISPM will not be sought as a source of long-term financing. Direct
investment financing and eventual long-term borrowing by the republics shall be facilitated
by inter-governmental agreements [Fischer, 1992, p. 45], and by project funding through
IMF, World Bank, EBRD, and other specialized institutions. This approach would very likely
promote economic transformation, while assigning long-term financing functions to ISPM
would rather delay it. In this sense, the ISPM should not interfere with national monetary
policies that would play an active role in stipulation of structural adjustment.
Furthermore, the ISPM shall be also treated as a facility assisting the establishment of a
system of independent, fully convertible currencies backed by adequate reserves. It appears,
that the current rapid destruction of inter-republican trade links is not favorable for a creation
of convertibility of new currencies at flexible exchange rates (see Appendix). It causes serious
short-term disequilibria and destabilizing currency speculation that need to be sterilized by
short term capital transfers. Constructed for this purpose, the ISPM would add to the creative
disintegration of the ruble zone by cushioning short-term

negative income shocks.

Consequently, it would prevent currency overshooting and promote realignments of exchange
rales between new currencies.
So far, by mid-1993 a very limited ground has been established for satisfactory arrangements
defending uninterrupted payments within the disintegrating ruble zone. Perhaps one of the
main reasons for the lack of reform is the isolation of central banks from governments which
in fact are the main negotiators of CIS agreements. While being in charge of monetary policy,
the CBR officially reports to the Parliament of the Russian Federation and not to the
President and the Ministry of Finance. Among the formal agreements between the CIS states
that have addressed the issue of intcr-state payments and the ruble zone are the Bishkiek
Agreement of October 9, 1992 and the Moscow CIS Summit Protocol of May 14, 1993. Bolh
of them acknowledge a support for maintaining the ruble zone and for establishing a
mechanism facilitating the bilateral ruble clearing system between central banks as a
temporary solution to a creation of the multilateral clearing bank called The Inter-Economic
Bank (Miezgosudarstviennyj Bank)[Kommersant, October 19, 1992, p. 29]. The Agreements
permit ruble surrogates (Bishkiek) and new currencies (Moscow) and express intentions to
establish an Inter-Nation Central Bank that would control the emission of Central Bank
credits, while the emission of cash will be left for the CBR. More precise functions of such a
Bank have not been defined and no agreement on the decision-making within its governing
body has been reached (the CBR wants more than one vote in it).
It seems desirable, that the CIS states should formally acknowledge the ruble zone
disintegration and work out a program of establishing exchange markets for independent

26
currencies. The new system will have to abandon the two-tier financing scheme, i.e. a
separation of credit and cash, allowing each country to freely exchange different monetary
assets. With the assistance of the IMF, the governments including central banks should more
actively attempt to establish the 1SPM as an institution facilitating a short-term credit for
trade financing.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The ruble /one disintegration is at the present stage irreversible. Most of the independent
republics are either actively introducing new currencies, or establishing plans to do so. Those
states heavily integrated with Russia's economy, most notably Kazakhstan, may consider
delaying such plans because a currency separation without an immediately guaranteed full
convertibility to the ruble would cause severe trade interruptions and income shocks. Even
Russia, unable to be competitive on international markets for many of its exports traded
within the CIS, has some incentives to maintain the ruble zone.
But the willingness to decouple their economies from the ruble inflation and to pursue fully
autonomous stabilization policies geared to their specific resource endowment and
transformation process is a more powerful argument for the republics to leave the ruble zone.
Additional pressures on dismantling the ruble zone are put by the IMF in its credit
conditioning policy. These influences arc accompanied by the willingness to gain more
autonomy in designing the economic policy and by a thirst to collect seigniorage revenues
from their own money creation. They create stronger incentives for the republics to secede
from the monetary union than the economic rationale to stay in it because of the short-term
inelasticity of trade linkages.
Under such circumstances, it seems appropriate for the republics to accept the introduction of
new currencies that shall be convertible for trade and capital transactions and exchanged at
flexible rates to avoid transmission of inflation shocks. Simultaneously, no restrictions on
inter-republican capital flight shall be adopted. For the existing impediments on capital
exchange, such as temporary bans of the central bank on acceptance of new state currencies,
mutual agreements on their elimination should be reached.
Only after independent and convertible currencies arc erected and their effective exchange
mechanism is established, steps toward new currency arrangements can be undertaken. Future
attempts to create a CIS currency union or at least a CIS currency exchange mechanism shall
be conditioned upon a successful coordination of monetary and fiscal policies, and
synchronization of privatization and structural adjustment programs. Then, perhaps, an
appropriate platform for currency arrangements based on fixed exchange rates may be
constructed. But this situation seems to be presently very distant.
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APPENDIX: TYPES OF NATIONAL CURRENCIES IN THE FORMER SOVIET
UNION
Countries may choose different forms of separation from the currency union by introducing
different types of their own currencies, ranging from a fully independent currency, via
coupons transitionary to independent currencies, to parallel surrogate currencies. This scale of
classification is based on the degree of isolation from the common currency with the separate,
fully independent money meaning the strongest severance. The choice of the degree of
separation by individual states from the common currency /one is dependent upon the
strength, or inelasticity of economic linkages with the countries that remain in it. If a single
state is able to find early enough recipients of its exportables and suppliers of its imported
materials outside the zone, and also if it expects large additional capital transfers from outside
it may pursue a higher degree of currency independence. In such a case, there is a chance that
the negative income shock related to balance of payments disturbances will be much milder.
Also, the country must have sufficient gold and hard currency reserves to guarantee the new
currency convertibility.
As of June 1993 an introduction of a fully independent currency has been finalized by Estonia
and Kirgizstan, as it was shown in Table 1. Estonia was able to find alternative trading
partners, primarily among the countries bordering the Baltic Sea, with Finland taking a lead
in its current account and capital account transactions in 1992. In the second half of May
1992, the Estonian Central Bank (Eesti Pank) started the process of introduction of the Kroon
[Ecsti Pank, The Monetary Reform of Estonia, 1992].
The Kroon was declared a convertible currency which emission became dependent on
changes in the country's gold and currency reserves estimated to be 120 million US Dollars at
that time. Approximately 30 percent of the Kroon emission was backed by the reserves. The
Kroon exchange rate was pegged to the German Mark at the 8 Kroon per 1 DM rate with the
permitted band of fluctuations plus-minus three percent. After one year, the Estonian decision
is generally viewed as a success. Inflation become very stable (after an initial mild shock in
June 1992) and real income has started to grow in 1993. The peg has been successfully
maintained and the Kroon has not yet been devaluated. On the other side, the Estonian trade
with Russia has virtually collapsed and the country's ruble debt to Russia has increased, but
only to about 4 billion rubles in 1992. The danger of the reform is that if Estonia is not able
to repay this debt by exporting to Russia, and if Russia demands its repayment in hard
currencies or gold the foundation of the monetary reform may be somewhat shaken. So far
such situation has not yet emerged.
The Kirgizstan case is somewhat different. Its central bank rather suddenly announced the
introduction of the som giving the residents a week to exchange rubles at 200 rb-per-som rate
[The Economist, May 29, 1993, p. 62]. The country seems not to have short-term trade
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alternatives that are available to Estonia, and its international reserves are probably
insufficient to tic changes in the som supply to their accumulation. The initial reports seem to
indicate that the main rationale for the reform was to insulate the state economy from the
ruble zone inflation. Kirgizstan expected to transfer excess supply of rubles to other republics.
Yet, the initial exchange rate set at four som per 1 US Dollar has not been sustainable. One
month later, on June 23, 1993, the rale was already 4.35. The banking infrastructure of the
country has also been poor resulting in the lack of deliveries of the som to remote areas of the
country in the designated one week period for the ruble exchange. Perhaps the most important
initial obstacle to the reform is a distrust of the economic agents in the new currency. They do
not believe the currency may lower inflationary pressures [Frankfurter Allgcmeine Zeilung,
June 4, 1993, p. 17J.
The experiences of these two former Soviet republics with the currency separation from the
ruble allow to draw several conclusions in terms of conditions "required for a successful
monetary reform:
-

the country must have alternative sources of currency earnings from exports outside the
ruble zone,

-

the country must be provided with sufficient gold and hard currency reserves, either
through short-term and long-term capital inflows or through foreign assistance,

-

the country must rapidly build up a banking system able to facilitate the reform [Sachs
andLipion, 1993],

-

the reform, its main goals, objectives and mechanics, must be consistent and reasonable to
economic agents,

-

the monetary authority must have a credible program of further monetary policy actions
following the currency introduction.

The key advantages of choosing fully independent currencies are consistent with a fulfillment
of the before examined postulates for the currency separation, such as the insulation from the
ruble zone inflation, a gain of a full monetary autonomy, seigniorage revenues, or
uninterrupted tax collection by avoidance of the Oliveira-Tanzi effect. Disadvantages of the
extreme form of the currency separation are consistent with a risk of excessive income shocks
if the country is not able to find alternative trading partners to Russia and to other members of
the ruble zone. There is always a risk of the reform failure if the above stated other conditions
for the currency separation are not met in practice.
Among the factors that would undermine the reform, the inflation differential shall be placed
on the forefront. If the republic breaking away from the ruble zone fails to control inflation
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better than the CBR, the domestic currency may turn out to be a poor store of value, and after
some time, it may be also useless as a unit of account and as a medium of exchange [Calvo
and Ve"gh, 1992, pp. 1-2]. Consequently, the "good" foreign money (ruble) may drive out the
"bad" domestic money.
There is also an additional disadvantage of the complete currency separation related to the
costs of printing money and to the transaction costs of exchanging money. Yet, with the
tremendous instability of the ruble, these costs cannot be expected to outweigh the benefits of
the money separation, at least for most of the republics who are willing to adopt stabilizing
monetary and fiscal policies.
A half-way option for a currency autonomy is the introduction of coupons. Formally, the
republics which adopted them pronounced their action as a temporary bridge to the
introduction of a fully independent currency. But in practice at least Ukraine and the Baltics
had also an important different motive. The early 1992 price liberalization in Russia
substantially boosted ruble prices of most of consumer goods on its territory. This, in turn,
gave incentives for Ukrainian companies and residents to sell goods in Russia. Such
shipments of goods to Moscow and other Russia's cities contributed to a drainage of many
consumer products from domestic markets and attributed to speculative sales. As a defense
mechanism against market shortages and their eventual political consequences, Ukraine
decided to introduce coupons. The mechanism of their initiation was based on a wage
compensation in coupons for workers which was lower than the parallelly received ruble
wage. Consequently, many consumer purchases required payments of matching numbers of
rubles and coupons [Hansson, 1993, p. 169]. The coupons, as they were built into the
compensation system, were equivalent to a cut in real wages. For a short period of time after
their introduction, they indeed contributed to the improvement of local market supplies and
their values were traded at a premium to the ruble, but after a few months their market trading
price fell and they were finally abandoned [ibid, 1993, p. 170].
A widely applied form of currency separation in the former Soviet Union are parallel, or
surrogate currencies. They have generally assumed two forms in response to the continuously
maintained two-tier financial system: republican credit, and national cash surrogates. On the
credit side, their market exchange rates have gone in very different directions, as shown in
Table 3. Their apparent deviations from the initial parity indicate that there are no market
fundamentals for maintaining fixed exchange rates between Russia's credits, and republican
credits. Main reasons for this situation can be sought in inconsistencies between directions of
monetary policies of individual central banks and in the lack of reserve transfers that would
be required to support fixed exchange rates.
Because of their temporary, or transitory nature both surrogate cash and republican credits do
not guarantee a more stable system-wide monetary policy. They give rise to speculative
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expectations on the currency depreciation and thus may absorb even more inflation than the
one transmitted via the ruble /.one. The uncertainly of their status may lead to their excessive
depreciation and to reinjection of inflation. On the other side, their main advantage is a lower
cost of introduction than the cost of fully independent currencies. They presumably also
create a lower degree of transaction risk in the national economy since they have to be
internally exchanged, or even pegged to the parallclly existing rubles. Both the coupons and
the surrogate currencies shall be rather dismissed as a viable alternative to separate currencies
once international transactions begin to play a more significant role in these economics.
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